Real
estate bubble, sub-prime mortgages, securitized products and their
derivatives were largely responsible for the ultimate collapse, leading
us the the economic conditions of today. Policy makers and investors
alike were, and still are, basing their actions on a false set of
commonly accepted myths.
The
first example is provided by the many different House Price Indexes.
Borrowing a table from my cyber-friend Calculated Risk, here are the
most recent changes in the indexes put together by various different
sources:
House price increases according to a variety of sources
Depending
on who one prefers to believe, house prices have appreciated between
5.2% to 13.2% year over year. Case-Shiller is probably the most commonly
referenced index today. Their fancy model with a nice interactive chart
can be found on the S&P/Case Shiller website. Those who want to engage in a bit of intellectual exercise can read the 48 page explanation of the Case Shiller methodology. A much better read however, is this simple one page overview by FNC
that debunks all the house price indexes, including their own. I would
like to add that no index takes into account the prevailing interest
rate and lending practices, and no-one has figured out a method to make
appropriate adjustments. For example, how does one compare a house that
sold for $100,000 in 2005 utilizing sub-prime financing, vs. the same
house that sold for $70,000 cash in 2013, with a few foreclosures and
flips in between? Was $100,000 a meaningful indication of value? Did it
really depreciate by 30% in 8 years? Here is the well-known Case-Shiller
chart:
Case Shiller house price indexes – click to enlarge.
Everyone is somewhat familiar with the chart. About the only conclusion I can draw is that easy monetary policy and irresponsible lending practices may lead to a bubble, and bubbles do always burst. It has no predictive value nor does it really tell one much about the past. Gurus may compare today's prices to the sub-prime peak or some imaginary "norm", as if that could offer guidance to policy and investment decisions.
Looking at the Case-Shiller 20 cities composite index simply makes no sense.
These
twenty cities all have different demographics that change independently
from one another over time. What would be the purpose of contemplating
these peaks and troughs, especially when combined in an index?
It
is baffling that the FOMC supposedly looks at data such as the various
House Price Indexes and somehow decides on that basis that buying agency
MBS is a good policy. They even figured out that $600 billion was the
right amount for QE1 in 2008, and an additional $600 billion was
appropriate for QE2 in 2010. Of course with QE3, the Fed determined that
$40 billion per month was good for 2013, but $35 billion is better for
2014.
The
wisdom of the Fed escapes me at the moment. Maybe it has other,
unrelated objectives in mind. Stay tuned for Debunking Real Estate Myths
– Part 2: Overly Stringent Underwriting.
Tables by: Calculated Risk & S&P/Case-Shiller, chart by S&P/Case-Shiller
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